Significant Changes Under Georgia’s New Tort Reform Legislation

Tue, Jun 3rd, 2025 | by Miles Mediation and Arbitration | Article |

By John Austin

 

You likely are aware that Governor Brian Kemp signed Georgia’s tort reform legislation (SB 68) on April 21, 2025, which made a number of changes to Georgia law. This article summarizes some of the major changes under that legislation, including the changes to the statutes restricting noneconomic damage arguments; staying discovery upon a motion to dismiss; and limiting the time to file a voluntary dismissal, as well as the new statute prohibiting the double recovery of attorney’s fees. It also addresses the new provisions on the admissibility of seat belt use usage evidence, the new statute on receovering medical and health care expenses; and the new statute on bifurcating trials.

 

  1. Restrictions on Noneconomic Damage Arguments

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184: This code section significantly limits when noneconomic damages may be argued to the jury. Subsection (b) states that “counsel shall not argue the worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages, and counsel shall not, in the hearing of the jury or any prospective juror, elicit any testimony regarding, or make any reference to, any specific amount or range of amounts of noneconomic damages…” except as provided in subsection (c).

Subsection (c)(1) states that counsel shall be allowed to argue noneconomic damages “only after the close of evidence and at the time of such party’s first opportunity to argue the issue of damages, provided that such argument shall be rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages and shall not make reference to objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved by the evidence.”

 

Subsection (c)(2) states that if counsel is entitled to present opening and concluding closing arguments, counsel cannot argue noneconomic damages in the concluding arguments unless such damages were argued in the opening closing arguments and shall not argue a different amount than what was argued in the opening closing arguments.

 

“Noneconomic damages” is defined in subsection (a)(2) as “all damages recoverable in tort for bodily injury or wrongful death other than economic damages, including, but not limited to, damages for physical or emotional pain, discomfort, anxiety, hardship, distress, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, and in wrongful death cases, the nonpecuniary elements of the full value of life.”

 

History: Amended by 2025 Ga. Laws 9, §1, eff. 4/21/2025, app. to causes of action pending on the 4/21/2025, unless such application would be unconstitutional.

 

  1. Discovery Stay Upon Motion to Dismiss

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12: Subsection (a)(2) extends the 30-day time period to file an Answer after service if a motion is filed “under this Code section” before the Answer is filed.  Subsection (a)(2) states that “serving a motion under this Code section alters the time for serving an answer pursuant to paragraph (1) [which is the section that a defendant shall serve an answer within 30 days of service] of this subsection as follows: (A) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until trial, the answer shall be served within 15 days after notice of the court’s action; or (B) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the answer shall be served within 15 days after the more definite statement is served.

 

Subsection (j)(1) further states that if a motion to dismiss if filed before an answer, “discovery shall be stayed until the ruling of the court on such motion; provided, however, that, if a defendant files an answer before the ruling of the court on such motion, the stay imposed by this subsection shall immediately terminate with respect to such defendant. The court shall decide the motion to dismiss within 90 days following the conclusion of briefing on such motion.” So, in short, discovery is stayed for up to 90 days or until the court rules on the motion unless an answer if filed before the ruling of the court.

 

Subsection (j)(2) states that “[t]he discovery period and all discovery deadlines shall be extended for a period equal to the duration of the stay imposed by this subsection.

 

There are other subsections to (j) such as (3) which addresses if a Court fails to rule within 90 days and (4) which addresses the need for limited discovery to respond to motions filed under Sec. 12(b) (2), (3), (5), or (7). Review of those subsections if those situations arise.

 

History: Amended by 2025 Ga. Laws 9, §2, eff. 4/21/2025, app. to causes of action pending on the 4/21/2025, unless such application would be unconstitutional. Amended by 2009 Ga. Laws 25, §4, eff. 7/1/2009.

 

  1. Limitations on Time to File Voluntary Dismissal

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a): The time within which a plaintiff can dismiss a case is significantly reduced under the new law. Now, “an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff, without order or permission of court: (A) By filing a written notice of dismissal at any time before the sixtieth day following the date the opposing party serves an answer; or (B) By filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.” In short, if the case is not dismissed “before the sixtieth day” (so by the 59th day) after the Answer is filed, it can only be dismissed by stipulation signed by all the parties.

 

History: Amended by 2025 Ga. Laws 9, §3, eff. 4/21/2025, app. to causes of action pending on the 4/21/2025, unless such application would be unconstitutional. Amended by 2003 Ga. Laws 363, §4, eff. 7/1/2003.

 

  1. Prohibition of Double Recovery of Attorney’s Fees and Proof of Fees

O.C.G.A. § 9-15-16 (NEW STATUTE): Subsection (a) states that in civil actions “no party shall recover the same attorney’s fees, court costs, or expenses of litigation more than once” even if one or more statutes authorize such awards, unless the statute(s) specifically authorize the recovery of duplicate attorney’s fees, court costs, or expenses of litigation.

 

Subsection (b) states that if a party seeks to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to a statute that authorizes such fees, “a contingent fee agreement between such party and such party’s attorney shall not be admissible as proof of the reasonableness of the fees.” The attorney will need to present other evidence that the fees are fair and reasonable. However, subsection (c) states that “[n]othing in this Code section shall limit or diminish any contractual right to recover attorney’s fees, court costs, or expenses of litigation.” So, all provisions of the contingency fee contract regarding fees, court costs, and expenses of litigation are still valid and enforceable between the attorney and the client.

 

History: Added by 2025 Ga. Laws 9, §4, eff. 4/21/2025, app. to causes of action pending on the 4/21/2025, unless such application would be unconstitutional.

 

  1. Admissibility of Seat Belt Usage Evidence

O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1: Subsection (d) states that “failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts may be considered in any civil action as evidence admissible on the issues of negligence, comparative negligence, causation, assumption of risk, or apportionment of fault or for any other purpose and maybe evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages….” However, this subsection further states it “shall not prevent a court from determining the admissibility of such evidence pursuant to Code Section 24-4-403 or any other statutory or common law rule of evidence.” O.C.G.A. 24-4-403 is the statute that allows relevant evidence to be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” In short, the admissibility of evidence that a plaintiff failed to wear a seatbelt is not automatically admissible, but if such evidence is presented, the burden seems to shift to the plaintiff to prove that the probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect to exclude that evidence. As a result, this evidentiary issue should be addressed in the Pre-Trial Order and presented to the court at the pre-trial conference.

 

History: Amended by 2025 Ga. Laws 10, §4, eff. 4/21/2025, app. only to causes of action commenced on or after 4/21/2025.Amended by 2025 Ga. Laws 9, §5, eff. 4/21/2025, app. to causes of action pending on the 4/21/2025, unless such application would be unconstitutional. Amended by 2015 Ga. Laws 146, §1, eff. 7/1/2015.Amended by 2011 Ga. Laws 62, §2, eff. 7/1/2011.Amended by 2010 Ga. Laws 609, §1, eff. 6/4/2010.Amended by 2005 Ga. Laws 68, §19-4, eff. 7/1/2005.Amended by 2004 Ga. Laws 572, § 2, eff. 7/1/2004.

 

  1. Recovery of Medical and Healthcare Expenses

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1.1 (NEW STATUTE): This section significantly changes how medical and healthcare expenses can be claimed and proven in civil actions.

 

Subsection (b) states that “[s]pecial damages for medical and healthcare expenses shall be limited to the reasonable value of medically necessary care, treatment, or services, and the amount of such special damages shall be determined by the trier of fact.”

 

Subsection (c) states that if the plaintiff has any form of public or private health insurance, including workers’ compensation, evidence to determine the reasonable value of the treatment shall include both the amounts charged for the past, present, and future treatment and the amounts necessary to satisfy those charges pursuant to the health insurance contract or workers’ compensation program regardless of whether health insurance has been used. In other words, the jury will see both the original price billed by the provider and the reduced amount typically paid by the insurer which will allow the jury to determine the reasonable value of the medical services.

 

Subsection (d) states that if the treatment is being rendered under a letter of protection or any other arrangement with the healthcare provider, the following shall be relevant and discoverable:

  • A copy of the letter of protection;
  • All charges which shall be itemized and, to the extent applicable, coded using generally accepted medical billing practices;
  • If the provider sells the accounts receivable to a third party for less than the invoice price, the name of the third party and the dollar amount it paid; and
  • Whether the plaintiff was referred for treatment under a letter of protection and, if so, the identity of the person who made the referral.

 

History: Added by 2025 Ga. Laws 9 §7, eff. 4/21/2025, app. only with respect to causes of action arising on or after 4/21/2025.

 

  1. Bifurcation of Trials

O.C.G.A. § 51-12-15 (NEW STATUTE): Sec. (a) states that in a bodily injury or wrongful death case, any party may “elect” in writing prior to the entry of a pretrial order, to divide the trial into separate phases.

 

Subsection (a)(1) states that the first phase will be to determine the fault of each defendant and “the percentages of fault of all persons or entities that contributed to such injuries or wrongful death as provided in Code Section 51-12-33….” (By citing O.C.G.A. 51-12-33, the statute also allows the jury to apportion fault to the plaintiff or any unnamed person or entity.) The evidence and arguments of counsel during this phase shall be limited to the issues of fault only and shall not include evidence or arguments of damages.

 

Subsection (a)(2) states that if any defendant is found at fault in phase one, then the trial shall recommence immediately before the same judge and jury to “determine all compensatory damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, if any….”

 

Subsection (a)(3) states that if the jury finds that compensatory damages are to be awarded to the plaintiff in phase two, then the trial shall recommence immediately before the same judge and jury to determine, if appropriate, punitive damages and any liability for, and the amount of, attorney’s fees, court costs, and expenses of litigation.

 

Subsection (b) states that the court may reject the election to divide the trial into phases if a motion is filed by an opposing party and the court determines that:

  • The plaintiff “was injured by an alleged sexual offense and would be likely to suffer serious psychological or emotional distress as a result of testifying more than once in a bifurcated proceeding;” or
  • The amount in controversy is less than $150,000.00.

 

History: Added by 2025 Ga. Laws 9, §8, eff. 4/21/2025, app. to causes of action pending on the 4/21/2025, unless such application would be unconstitutional.

 

The Georgia tort reform changes will impact both plaintiffs and defendants. Counsel should ensure they are familiar with the new changes to exisiting laws, and with the news laws, to provide zealous representation of their clients.

 

*Originally published in the Daily Report and reprinted with permission.

 

 

About John Austin

John Austin is a registered civil mediator with the Georgia Office of Dispute Resolution who joined Miles Mediation in 2014. A founding member of Austin & Sparks, P.C., he has been a trial attorney handling traumatic injury and wrongful death cases for nearly four decades for plaintiffs and defendants. He has considerable trial experience handling automobile, motor carrier, products liability, property damage, and premises liability cases, as well as in the prosecution and defense of declaratory judgment actions concerning contractual disputes and insurance coverage issues.

 

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