The Dangerous Misapplication of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 Limited Liability Releases in Non-Motor Vehicle Accident Claims

Fri, Jan 2nd, 2026 | by Miles Mediation and Arbitration | Article | Social Share

 By Marc Barré and Scott Connally

Georgia personal injury practitioners are increasingly encountering settlement demands in non-motor vehicle tort cases that require the use of a “limited liability release” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1. This practice, though perhaps well-intentioned, creates significant risks for both plaintiffs and defendants. The statute in question applies exclusively to motor vehicle accidents, and its misapplication in other contexts could bar legitimate claims or create ambiguity about the scope of releases executed in settlement.

The Need for the Statute
To understand why the misapplication of § 33-24-41.1 is problematic, practitioners must first understand what the statute does and why it exists. Prior to 1992, Georgia law required an uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM) carrier to insist that an injured claimant obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor in excess of the liability coverage limits before the UM carrier would pay benefits. As the Georgia Court of Appeals explained in Ferguson v. Spraggins, “an uninsured motorist carrier could require that an injured claimant (the carrier’s insured) obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor in excess of the liability coverage limit as a condition for recovery of underinsured motorist benefits.” 371 Ga. App. 727, 730 (2024).
This requirement created a significant practical problem whereby an injured plaintiff might wish to settle with the at-fault driver’s liability carrier for the policy limits, but doing so would preclude any recovery from the plaintiff’s own UM coverage. The plaintiff would be forced to litigate the case to judgment simply to preserve UM benefits, even when the liability carrier was willing to tender its full policy limits.

The Enactment of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1
The Georgia General Assembly addressed this problem in 1992 by enacting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1. The statute authorizes the injured claimant to settle with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier by accepting payment of the carrier’s limits of liability coverage in return for the claimant’s execution of a limited release applicable to the settling carrier and its insured based on injuries to such claimants.

The statute’s applicability is explicitly limited by its plain language. Subsection (a) states: “In any instance where a claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident is covered by two or more insurance carriers, one such carrier may tender, and the claimant may accept, the limits of such policy.” Per its plain language, the statute applies only to motor vehicle accidents. It does not apply to premises liability claims, dog bites, slip and falls, medical malpractice, products liability, or any other tort claim that does not arise from a motor vehicle accident. Indeed, the statutory framework only makes sense in motor vehicle cases because Georgia law requires motor vehicle insurers to offer UM coverage. No comparable requirement exists for other liability insurance.

A Closer Look at UM Coverage
Understanding why the distinction between general and limited releases matters requires understanding the derivative nature of UM coverage. As the Court of Appeals explained in Rodgers v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., when a plaintiff executes a general release, “the uninsured motorist carrier was also released as a matter of law because of the derivative nature of the insurance company’s liability.” 228 Ga. App. 499, 501 (1997). Once the plaintiff releases all claims against the tortfeasor, there is no basis of liability on which the UM carrier can be held responsible under the policy terms.

A limited release under § 33-24-41.1 solves this problem by releasing the tortfeasor from personal liability while preserving the underlying liability determination necessary to pursue UM claims. The statute requires specific language, including releasing “the settling carrier from all liability from any claims of the claimant” and releasing the tortfeasor “except to the extent other insurance coverage is available.”

In Newstrom v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 343 Ga. App. 576, 579 (2017), the Court held that “a claimant who settles with a tortfeasor must execute a limited release pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-41.1 in order to preserve the claimant’s pending claim for UM motorist benefits.” The Georgia Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed this strict compliance requirement in Barker v. Muschett, A25A0583 (Ga. Ct. App. June 2, 2025), holding that a release which attempted to preserve UM benefits by excepting “other insurance coverage” but failed to release the settling carrier as required by § 33-24-41.1(b)(1) did not preserve the plaintiff’s UM claim. The court emphasized that “both of these requirements [have] to be fulfilled before [a plaintiff can] pursue his UM claims,” meaning settlement for policy limits and execution of a compliant limited release. Failure to comply with the statute’s requirements results in complete loss of UM benefits, as demonstrated in Rodgers where a plaintiff who executed a general release instead of a limited release “defeated his ability to collect under-insured motorist benefits” entirely. 228 Ga. App. at 501.

The Problem with Using § 33-24-41.1 in Non-Motor Vehicle Cases
When § 33-24-41.1 is invoked in non-motor vehicle cases, several problems arise. First and most fundamentally, the statute simply doesn’t apply. Courts must give statutes their plain meaning, and a premises liability case cannot involve a “claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident” no matter what the parties call it. As the Georgia Supreme Court has instructed in Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (2013), “when we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”

Second, no underlying insurance structure exists to support the statutory framework. The statute presupposes UM coverage and multiple insurance carriers covering the same motor vehicle accident, and these elements don’t exist in premises liability or other non-motor vehicle cases. Third, misapplication creates ambiguity and uncertainty. Courts might treat the misapplied statutory reference as a nullity, interpret the release under general contract principles (potentially against the drafter under Georgia’s rule that ambiguities are construed against the drafter), or find it creates confusion requiring extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Finally, parties may believe they have preserved or limited certain rights when in fact the statutory framework they invoked doesn’t apply to their case, leading to unintended consequences that may not become apparent until litigation arises.

Inaccurate Templates May Cause Issues
Practitioners report receiving settlement demands in non-motor vehicle cases that explicitly invoke § 33-24-41.1, often using language copied directly from motor vehicle settlement forms. The proliferation of form documents contributes to this problem. Attorneys who successfully use § 33-24-41.1 releases in motor vehicle cases may save them as templates and inadvertently use them in inappropriate cases without recognizing that the statutory framework does not apply. While no published Georgia appellate decision directly addresses this misapplication, the absence of such authority is a warning sign rather than permission to continue the practice.

When the issue eventually reaches an appellate court, the result is unlikely to favor parties who invoked a statute outside its express scope, particularly given Georgia courts’ consistent instruction that statutes must be given their plain meaning and that courts must presume the General Assembly “meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal, 294 Ga. at 172-173. Indeed, in a recent decision involving another settlement statute, the Court of Appeals in Lester v. Hampton, A25A1078 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2025), reinforced that compliance with a settlement statute is mandatory and that a party’s failure to reference the applicable statute does not exempt the settlement from that statute’s requirements.

Advice for Attorneys and Mediators
Plaintiff’s attorneys should be very wary of demanding limited liability releases in non-motor vehicle cases. Instead, they should use standard general releases or draft specific limitations without invoking inapplicable statutes. Before using any settlement form, verify the basis of your claim and ensure the form language is appropriate for your case type. In motor vehicle cases where you need to preserve UM claims, § 33-24-41.1 limited releases are appropriate, but counsel must ensure they comply with all statutory requirements, particularly the requirement to release the settling carrier from all liability.

For defense attorneys, if you receive a settlement demand requiring the use of a limited liability release in a non-motor vehicle case, consider whether acceptance of the demand is appropriate. If the opportunity exists, consider discussing with counsel that the statute applies only to motor vehicle accidents and offer to prepare an appropriate general release instead, or if opposing counsel insists on specific limitations, work together to draft clear language that does not invoke inapplicable statutes. If opposing counsel forbids contact regarding the terms of the demand, a decision will have to be made on whether to accept the demand as made.

For mediators facilitating settlement discussions, understanding that § 33-24-41.1 applies only to motor vehicle accidents is essential to avoid helping parties create unenforceable or ambiguous settlements. When mediating non-motor vehicle cases, direct parties away from motor vehicle settlement language and toward clear, case-appropriate release language that accomplishes their actual settlement goals without invoking inapplicable statutory terms.

There is not currently a Georgia appellate decision on the effect of a limited liability release used in a non-motor vehicle situation. When confronted with this issue, the Georgia courts may find that the use of a limited liability release in a non-motor vehicle situation has the effect of a general release or that no enforceable settlement was reached. Thus, both sides are at risk when using a limited liability release outside of the statutory framework of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1.

The Takeaway
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 is a powerful and important tool for resolving motor vehicle accident cases efficiently while protecting injured parties’ rights to pursue UM benefits from their own insurance carriers. The statute’s plain language limits its application to motor vehicle accidents, and its purpose depends entirely on an insurance structure unique to motor vehicle coverage mandated by Georgia law. As the Court of Appeals explained in Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 320 Ga. App. 271, 273-274 (2013), “the limited release provisions of OCGA § 33-24-41.1 were enacted to provide a statutory framework for a claimant injured in an automobile accident to settle with the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier for the liability coverage limit while preserving the claimant’s pending claim for underinsured motorist benefits against the claimant’s own insurance carrier.”

Practitioners serve their client’s best interests by using § 33-24-41.1 only in motor vehicle cases and using appropriate general release language in all other contexts. As our profession evolves and form documents are increasingly shared and reused across different types of cases, vigilance about the proper application of specialized statutes becomes ever more important. Clients deserve counsel who understand the legal tools they use and apply them appropriately to the specific circumstances of each case.

*Originally published in the Daily Report and reprinted with permission.

About Marc Barré

Marc Barré is a seasoned mediator and arbitrator with decades of legal practice experience. As a highly skilled neutral, he has cultivated an ability to develop creative solutions for clients in nuanced matters that require outside-of-the-box thinking.